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COOPERATION IN VISCOUS POPULATIONS  
– EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
 








We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased 
probability to interact with others of one’s type or group) on cooperation in a standard 
prisoner’s dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups 
that differ in the defector gain in the associated prisoner’s dilemma. Choosing into the 
group with the smaller defector-gain can signal one’s willingness to cooperate. The 
degree of viscosity is varied across treatments. We find that viscosity produces an 
endogenous sorting of cooperators and defectors and persistently high rates of 
cooperation. Higher viscosity leads to a sharp increase in overall cooperation rates and 
in addition positively affects the subjects’ intrinsic willingness to cooperate. 
 
Keywords: Experiments, Cooperation, Group Selection, Norms, Population 
Viscosity. 
 
JEL classification: C70, C73, C90. 1 Introduction
Population viscosity refers to a tendency of agents in a population to interact
with increased probability with other individuals of their own type. The
concept is often used in evolutionary biology to explain the emergence of
altruistic behavior in both animals and humans.1 The intuition simply is that
if altruists interact with (suﬃciently) increased probability among themselves
they beneﬁt more often from the cooperative behavior of others and thus
enjoy higher ﬁtness than selﬁsh types. While there is a lot of theoretical work
on viscosity, to our knowledge viscosity has not been tested experimentally.2
In this experiment we investigate the eﬀect of population viscosity on
cooperation and the strength of cooperative norms in a standard prisoner’s
dilemma environment. More precisely we try to answer the following ques-
tions.
• Can population viscosity induce an endogenous sorting of cooperators
and defectors?
• Can persistently high rates of cooperation be sustained in suﬃciently
viscous populations?
• What is the eﬀect of viscosity on cooperative norms?
To answer these research questions we tried to choose an experimental
design that is both simple and natural for these kinds of questions. Subjects
in our experiment play 100 rounds of a prisoner’s dilemma game. They can
repeatedly choose between two groups. In one of the groups (group A) the
defector payoﬀ is lower making cooperation less costly relative to defection.
Agents can choose into that group in order to signal their willingness to co-
operate. The degree of population viscosity, i.e. the probability of interacting
with others of one’s own group, is varied across treatments.
We ﬁnd that participants choose group A if and only if the degree of
viscosity (or separation between groups) is high enough. Also, while most
of the agents in the ”cooperative” group cooperate whenever the degree of
viscosity is high, agents in the other group almost never cooperate. Both,
the share of agents that choose into the ”cooperative” group and the share
1See Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005), Richerson, Boyd and
Henrich (2003), Myerson, Pollock and Swinkels (1991), Mengel (2007a) or Wilson and
Sober (1994), among others. Early references are Hamilton (1964) or Price (1971).
2An exception is Grimm and Mengel (2007), which we discuss below. There are also
several experimental works on group selection (e.g. Page, Puttermann and Unel (2005) or
Bohnet and K¨ ubler (2005)) but none of them investigate population viscosity.
2of agents that cooperate, rise sharply and monotonically with the degree of
population viscosity. With high viscosity 35%-60% (depending on the exact
degree of viscosity) of all subjects choose group A and cooperate until the
end of the experiment.
An interesting feature of our results is that we do not observe an endgame
eﬀect (i.e. cooperation does not decline towards the end of the experiment).
Note also that there is no punishment mechanism whatsoever that could
induce agents to cooperate. Furthermore there is no exclusion, i.e. defectors
are always free to (costlessly) switch into group A. The fact that they do
not do so (although it would be proﬁtable under high viscosity as our results
show), is evidence for an implicit consensus that supports an endogenous
sorting of cooperative and non-cooperative types. Of course, if cooperators
were motivated by purely altruistic motives, viscosity would not be necessary
in our experiment to sustain cooperation. Our results (in particular the
breakdown of cooperation under low viscosity) indicate that subjects rather
than being altruists are conditional cooperators, i.e. are willing to cooperate
only if they expect many others to do so.
To further investigate this conjecture we use a random utility model and
estimate the subjects’ intrinsic disposition to cooperate as a function of the
expected probability of cooperation of others. We ﬁnd that subjects indeed
act as conditional cooperators, i.e. are more willing to cooperate if the share
of cooperators is higher. This eﬀect is more pronounced for high degrees of
viscosity. Measurement of the individual cooperator types reveals that as
viscosity decreases there are signiﬁcantly less agents guided by cooperative
norms and signiﬁcantly more ﬂat defectors. These results take into account
only the intrinsic - not the extrinsic (material) - incentives to cooperate.3
Our experimental evidence allows us to answer the above questions as
follows.
• Viscosity can induce an endogenous sorting of cooperators and defec-
tors.
• Viscosity can sustain persistently high cooperation in the population.
There is no endgame eﬀect.
• Viscosity seems to increase the intrinsic willingness of subjects to co-
operate.
3The pattern of cooperator types we ﬁnd is roughly consistent with results by Fis-
chbacher, Fehr and G¨ achter (2001), Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2006) or Brandts and
Schram (2001).
3Let us ﬁnally relate our study to the experimental literature. Only very
recently experimental economics has started to focus on the relation between
interaction structures and cooperation. Coricelli, Fehr and Fellner (2004),
Engelmann and Grimm (2006), or Page, Putterman and Unel (2005) are
examples of studies in which agents can endogenously choose interaction
partners.4 In Bohnet and K¨ ubler (2005) subjects can choose between groups
that are perfectly separated. In this study, however, cooperation cannot
establish at a high level. Two studies investigate group selection in the
presence of punishment institutions. Guererk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach
(2006) and Grimm and Mengel (2007) show that subjects learn to choose
into a group where a punishment mechanism is at place.5 In Grimm and
Mengel (2007) we induced agents to cooperate via a sanctioning mechanism
in group A. In that study we were interested in the question whether agents
opt for such a mechanism or not. All the above studies (except Grimm and
Mengel (2007)) deal only with the case of perfect separation of groups. To
our knowledge our studies are the ﬁrst to analyze population viscosity in an
experiment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design. The results from the experiment are presented and discussed in
Section 3. In Section 4 we derive a random utility model in order to estimate
the norms that guide the subjects’ behavior and report the results. Section 5
concludes. The appendix contains regression tables and a translation of the
experimental instructions.
2 The Experiment
In our experiment 128 participants (with no, or very little, prior exposure to
game theory) anonymously interacted in a social dilemma situation in 100
rounds.6 Each round consisted of three stages. In the ﬁrst stage subjects
chose their group. In the second stage they had to deliver an estimate of the
cooperativeness of their next round match. And at the last stage they played
a prisoner’s dilemma game.
We ran three treatments that diﬀered in the matching technology. In
all three treatments matching took place in a viscous population, meaning
that individuals faced an increased probability to interact with others of their
group. The degree of viscosity is measured by the parameter x ∈ [0,1]. x = 1
4See also Ones and Putterman (2006) or the literature on network experiments reviewed
in Falk and Kosfeld (2003).
5See also Goette, Huﬀman and Meier (2006) for a ﬁeld study on these issues.
6We excluded economics and business students from the experiment.
4corresponds to the case of (unbiased) random matching. x = 0 means that
the population is fully viscous, implying that agents interact with probability
1 with agents of the same group and never with agents from another group.
In a viscous society with parameter x, if pA is the share of agents of type A
(members of group A) the probability for any one of them to interact with
a B type is (1 − pA)x = pBx and the probability to interact with a member
of group A is (1 − (1 − pA)x) = 1 − pBx. The matching probabilities are
summarized in Table 1.
A B
A 1 − pBx pBx
B pAx 1 − pAx
Table 1: Matching Probabilities
In the experiment we chose the values x ∈ {0, 1
3, 2
3} for our three treat-
ments T0, T1 and T2. One population consisted of 8 subjects. The members
of a population were initially randomly assigned to groups A and B in equal
proportions. At the ﬁrst stage of each round, two of the eight subjects could
decide to either join the other group, or to stay in their own group. Each
subject could make this decision every fourth round. At the second stage
of each round subjects were asked for their expectation on the cooperation
probability of their match.7 At the third stage subjects played the prisoner’s
dilemma game with payoﬀs as given by Table 2 with an interaction partner
who was assigned randomly according to the matching technology. As it can
be seen from Table 2, the two groups diﬀer only in the defector’s payoﬀ. In-
dependently of their group membership, subjects face a prisoner’s dilemma
game. However, in group A the defector’s payoﬀ is lower (i.e. cooperation is
less costly as compared to defection).
Group A other Group B other
C D C D
me C 800 100 me C 800 100
D 850 150 D 1100 400
Table 2: Payoﬀs in the Prisoner Dilemma Games.
Prior to playing the game subjects were informed about (a) the percentage
of subjects in groups A and B, and (b) their individual probability to meet
7We did not pay this answer because we wanted to avoid that subjects try to trade oﬀ
earnings from correct guessing and from the game’s payoﬀs.
5a group A and group B member, respectively. When choosing an action in
the bilateral game at stage three, agents had incomplete information about
the group membership (i.e. the type) of their match.8 They had to estimate
the type of their match from the information we gave to them.
Since in our experiment the population was necessarily ﬁnite, one-to-one
matching was not feasible. Instead, we ﬁrst realized a random draw with
the probabilities given in Table 1 to decide whether a subject’s interaction
partner was from group A or B. Then the interaction partner played the
actions ”cooperate” or ”defect” with probabilities that corresponded to the
proportions with which those actions were played in the respective group
(in that round). In the unlikely event that only one subject remained in a
group (either A or B) and the ﬁrst random draw determined that he had to
play against an member of his own group, the subject’s interaction partner
was preprogrammed to play C or D with equal probabilities.9 After each of
the 100 rounds, subjects were informed of whether their interaction partner
belonged to group A or B, his action, and their own monetary payoﬀs.
The experiment was conducted in four sessions in October, 2006. The
four experimental sessions were computerized.10 Written instructions were
distributed at the beginning of the experiment.11 Each session took ap-
proximately 90-120 minutes (including reading the instructions, answering a
post-experimental questionnaire and receiving payments). Subjects partici-
pating in the experiment received 2.50 Euros just to show up. On average
subjects earned Euro 15.16 (all included).
3 Results
Figure 1 impressively illustrates the eﬀect population viscosity has on group
choice. While under perfect separation of groups (treatment T0) a high share
of subjects join group A, the share of subjects that choose into group A de-
creases as viscosity decreases. We ﬁnd that in the treatments with a high
degree of viscosity group A contains a considerable share of subjects (aver-
ages are 59.2% in treatment T0 and 36.8% in treatment T1). Interestingly,
we do not observe that the share of subjects decreases in the last periods.
8This is not true for treatment T0 where agents were certain to interact with a member
of their own group.
9The subjects were informed that the interaction partner would use a preprogrammed
strategy in this case.
10The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007).
11The instructions for T1 (x = 1
3), translated from German into English, can be found
in the Appendix. Instructions for the remaining treatments are available upon request.
6In treatment T2, on the contrary, group A shrinks and ﬁnally disappears
(the average share of subjects in group A is 9.8%). Pairwise comparison of
the three treatments shows that all diﬀerences in group choice are highly
signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney Test, p = 0.0000). Summing up, we observe an
endogenous sorting of the subjects in the two groups under high viscosity
(x = 0 and x = 1
3), whereas under low viscosity almost all subjects pool in
the same group (group B).
Figure 1: The Share of Subjects in Group A (per Treatment).
Result 1 (Group Choice) The share of subjects in group A is the higher,
the more viscous the population is. In T0 and T1 a constant share of around
60% and 35%, respectively, is in group A. In treatment T2 the share of sub-
jects in group A decreases until it is ﬁnally zero.
Taken by itself Result 1 only shows that some sorting took place. The really
interesting question is of course whether this sorting does indeed produce
cooperative behavior. Analyzing cooperation rates separately for the two
diﬀerent groups (A and B) reveals that in all treatments the majority of
subjects in group A cooperates, while almost no group B–member does.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the shares of cooperating subjects in group A
is constantly around 60% in treatments T0 and T1. In treatment T2 the
cooperation rate in group A ﬂuctuates a lot, which is mainly due to the
low number of subjects in group A. Note that Figures 1 and 2 also show
that - unlike in most other experimental studies of cooperation - cooperation
does not break down at the end of the experiment, i.e. there is no so-called
7Figure 2: Shares of Cooperators in Group A (per Treatment).
”endgame eﬀect”. This illustrates a) that viscosity produces persistent coop-
eration and b) that the behavior observed is not driven by the use of repeated
game strategies of players with limited foresight.
Figure 3 shows that in group B initial cooperation quickly breaks down
and that from round 20 on almost no one cooperates in that group. Table 3
gives an overview over average cooperation rates, separately for both groups
and the whole population. The table illustrates that higher viscosity leads
to a sharp increase in overall cooperation rates. Pairwise comparison of
overall cooperation rates between treatments shows that all diﬀerences are
highly signiﬁcant. (Mann-Whitney Test, p = 0.0000). Note that given the
share of cooperation in group A any defector could obtain a higher payoﬀ
by switching from group B to group A (compare also Table 4 below). This
eﬀect is particularly strong in treatment T0. There seems to be some sort
of implicit consensus sustaining sorting (and thus cooperation) that prevents
defectors from doing so.
Result 2 (Cooperation)
Subjects in group A cooperate signiﬁcantly more than subjects in group B.
Consequently the rate of cooperation is highest in treatment T0 and lowest in
treatment T2.
The observed behavior (concerning group choice and cooperation) had
clear consequences on proﬁts. Note that overall rates of cooperation in the
population were the higher, the higher population viscosity was (compare
8Figure 3: Shares of Cooperators in Group B (per Treatment).
Treatment Group Overall
A B
x = 0 62.4 9.9 41.0
x = 1
3 67.1 3.2 26.7
x =
2
3 59.5 6.7 11.9
Table 3: Average Cooperation Rates
also table 3). Consequently, payoﬀs were highest in treatment T0, lowest
(and close to the payoﬀs from mutual defection) for T2, and in between for
the remaining treatment. Table 4 reports the proﬁts obtained in the diﬀerent
treatments.
Result 3 (Profits)
(i) Average proﬁts in the population are highest in treatment T0, followed by
T1 and T2.
(ii) The proﬁt of a group A–member is higher than the proﬁt of a group B–
member in treatments T0 and T1 and the opposite is true in T2.
The payoﬀ diﬀerences in group A are highly signiﬁcant between all treat-
ments (Mann-Whitney Test, p = 0.0000). There are no signiﬁcant payoﬀ
diﬀerences in group B between treatments T0 and T1 (Mann-Whitney Test,
p = 0.6732). Diﬀerences between T0 and T2 as well as between T1 and
9Treatment Group Overall
A B
x = 0 560 457 518
x =
1
3 494 460 472
x = 2
3 350 452 436
Table 4: Proﬁts.
T2 though are signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney Test, p = 0.0516 (0.0055)). The
intuition simply is that since in T2 overall cooperation converges quickly to
zero, there are no possibilities for exploitation. The diﬀerences, though, are
small (and for T0 only weakly signiﬁcant) as possibilities for exploitation are
small (or even non-existent) in T0 and T1 as well because of high viscosity.
Note that Table 4 also shows that group choice is not an equilibrium
(given action choice). In particular agents in treatment T0 have strong in-
centives to switch from group B to group A (irrespective of whether they
correlate group choice with action choice).12 Viscosity seems to induce a con-
sensus for an endogenous sorting of diﬀerent cooperator types.13 Of course
if cooperators are motivated by unconditional altruism, sorting (or viscosity)
is not necessary to sustain cooperation in the experiment. If they are condi-
tional cooperators, though, (cooperating only if they believe that their match
is likely to do so as well) viscosity can become necessary to sustain coopera-
tion. Our results indicate that this could be the case (as in T2 cooperation
breaks down).14 The aim of the next section is to investigate this conjecture
and to gain a better understanding of the diﬀerent intrinsic incentives of our
subjects.
12The payoﬀ diﬀerences persist if one omits the ﬁrst rounds of the experiment, as should
also become clear from inspection of Figures 1-3.
13One could also think that (as we do not provide information on average payoﬀs)
subjects are simply not able to learn the payoﬀ-diﬀerences. Inspection of the individual
data though shows that (almost) all subjects switch groups often in the ﬁrst 50 rounds of
the experiment and do experiment with action choice (mostly in early rounds).
14Other studies have shown that subjects often behave as conditional cooperators. See
Fischbacher, Fehr and G¨ achter (2001) or Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2006). See Mengel
(2007a) for a theoretical analysis of the relation between viscosity and the emergence of
conditionally cooperative behavior.
104 Feedback Eﬀects between Interaction
Structure and Norm
Our results clearly indicate that subjects display intrinsic incentives to coop-
erate.15 To estimate those intrinsic incentives we use a model which assumes
that the subjects attach a value w to ”being cooperative” as compared to
defecting. Let us call a subject’s incentive w his or her norm in the following.
We use the general term ”norm” here, because the psychological incentives
we model could either stem from private (moral) norms of cooperation (that
possibly depend on how others behave) or from social norms (shared beliefs)
of behavior.16 We are interested in whether such norms exist and how (if at
all) their shape varies with the matching structure.17 Estimating the norm
w both, at the aggregate and at the individual level we ﬁnd that indeed it
changes with the degree of population viscosity.
4.1 The Model
To estimate the norm w we use a random utility model. Consider the fol-
lowing payoﬀ matrix (payoﬀs for row player, denoted player i). wi measures
other
C D
me (player i) C 800 + εiC 100 + εiC
D 850 + 250δi
B − wi + εiD 150 + 250δi
B − wi + εiD
Table 5: Random Utilities.
player i′s intrinsic incentive to cooperate (i.e. his norm), δi
B(t) = 1 if i is
in group B at time t and zero otherwise, and εiC, εiD are error terms. We
deﬁne εi = εiD −εiC. We denote by b cit the probability with which an agent i
believes that his match cooperates at time t (we elicit this probability in our
15Since a) we do not observe endgame eﬀects and b) observe suboptimal group choice,
the observed behavior seems diﬃcult to explain through strategic behavior of agents that
only consider the monetary incentives.
16One possibility to distinguish between the two is to elicit second-order beliefs (i.e.
inquiring about the probability with which one beliefs one’s partner believes that one
cooperates). We chose not to do so in order to leave the experimental setting as simple as
possible and leave this open question for further research.
17If this is indeed the case interesting eﬀects arise as has been studied theoretically by
Benabou and Tirole (2007), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999), Mengel (2007b) and
Traxler (2005).
11experiment). Say cit = 1 if agent i cooperates at time t and cit = 0 otherwise.
Then the expected utility of an agent can be written,
U(cit) = 800b cit + 100(1 − b cit) + εiCt | {z }
exp. proﬁt from coop.
+(1 − cit) (50 + 250δB(t) − wi + εit)
| {z }
add. perceived proﬁt from defection
.
(1)
The choice rule of an expected utility maximizing agent then predicts that




it = wi − (50 + 250δB(t)) + εit
is negative, a subject cooperates whereas if it is positive, the subject defects.










we have a logit choice model. We want to allow the intrinsic incentives of
the agent (or in other words their norms) to depend on the beliefs b c. In the
estimation we consider the following quadratic speciﬁcation for the norm w,
wi = ni + mib c + li (b c)
2 .
The case where w is a constant and does not depend on b c and the case where
w is linear in b c will be treated as special cases of the quadratic model where
the coeﬃcients of higher order terms are zero. We estimate a logit choice
model where the independent variables are the expected monetary payoﬀ of
defection as compared to cooperation (∆ = 50+250δB) as well as the agent’s
norm wi = ni + mib c + li (b c)
2. The logit model for the quadratic case can be
written






Regressing Pr(cit = 1) on b cit , (b cit)
2and δi
B(t), we have that (given our utility
model) the coeﬃcient for the constant term (of the regression) is an estimate
of µ(mi−50), the coeﬃcient on δi
B(t) is an estimate of −250µ, the coeﬃcient
on b cit is an estimate of µni and the coeﬃcient on (b cit)
2 is an estimate of µli.
Comparing these coeﬃcients allows us to eliminate µ and thus to distinguish
between the eﬀect of noise and that of the norm.
124.2 Results
We ﬁnd that on average the norm depends as follows on b c in our three
treatments.18
w0 = −103.77 + 838.01b c − 545.21(b c)
2 in T0
w1 = −111.3 + 812.25b c − 543.71(b c)
2 in T1
w2 = −119.72 + 1104.0b c − 995.91(b c)
2 in T2
If b c = 0 the norm w is actually negative, i.e. subjects seem to have addi-
tional incentives to defect. This could indicate the presence of motives like
”spite” or ”anger”. But then the norm-function is rapidly increasing in b c
in all treatments indicating that conditional cooperation is a strong behav-
ioral motive. All three functions are concave in b c, i.e. intrinsic incentives to
cooperate seem to rise faster with b c for smaller levels of cooperation.
Figure 4: Average Norm and Material Incentives.
The result is illustrated in Figure 4. In the ﬁgure, the lower of the two sim-
ilar lines is T1, whereas the most ”U-shaped” one is T2. In all treatments
subjects on average are reluctant to cooperate if they expect cooperative
behavior only of a low fraction of other subjects (the functions w(b c) are in-
creasing). These ﬁndings are well in line with other experimental ﬁndings,
18The regression tables are given in the appendix.
13like Fischbacher, Fehr and G¨ achter (2001) or Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2006)
who observe conditionally cooperative behavior. We do not only observe con-
ditionally cooperative behavior, but are indeed able to identify a behavioral
motive for conditional cooperation.
In addition viscosity seems to have some feedback eﬀect on cooperative
norms. Under full viscosity (x = 0) the norm is slightly stronger than with
x = 1/3. In treatment T2 the function w(b c) is inversely U-shaped. This
implies low willingness to cooperate also if subjects expect a high share of
cooperators among the other players (whereas subjects are rather coopera-
tive if they expect intermediate cooperation rates). If population viscosity is
low, the possibility to exploit other subjects seems to yield additional psy-
chological beneﬁts for the agents.19





Constant Model 13 % 6 % 3 %
Linear Model 38 % 36 % 16 %
Quadratic Model 19 % 10 % 13 %
C in A, D in B 6 % 13 % 3 %
Always C 4 % 2 % 0 %
Always D 10 % 27 % 53 %
None 10 % 6 % 12 %
Table 6: Subject Classiﬁcation in the Three Treatments.
Naturally the average norm does not reﬂect all the diﬀerences at the in-
dividual level. In order to investigate how individual behavior diﬀered across
treatments we ran individual regressions for each subject in each treatment.
This allowed us to classify the subjects into six types that displayed diﬀerent
kinds of norm guided behavior. The results are given in table 6. A subject
is attributed the model that ﬁts best. To be attributed any model all, the
coeﬃcients of the regression have to be signiﬁcant at 10% at least.20 Subjects
who cooperate/defect at least 91 out of 100 times are classiﬁed into always
C / always D, respectively. Subjects that follow a strategy C in A and D in
B at least 91 out of 100 times are classiﬁed into that category. Those who
cannot be classiﬁed in any of the categories are classiﬁed into ”none of the
previous”.
19Of course there are only few data points for high values of b c in the treatment T2. (In
fact there are only 11 guesses exceeding 90% in this treatment). Consequently the results
should be interpreted with some care. The coeﬃcient on (b c)
2 is though signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from that in the treatments T0 and T1.
20Mostly the signiﬁcance level is 1%.
14It is remarkable that the total share of norm guided agents (constant
model, linear model, quadratic model and always C) decreases and that of
ﬂat defectors (always D) increases as population viscosity decreases.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have experimentally investigated the impact of population
viscosity on cooperation in social dilemma situations. Participants in our
experiment could repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of
them cooperation was less costly as compared to defection. The degree of
population viscosity was varied between treatments. We found that under
high population viscosity many subjects chose into the group with the lower
defector payoﬀ in order to signal their willingness to cooperate. In all treat-
ments a signiﬁcant share of subjects actually cooperated in that group, while
almost no subject cooperated in the other group. The share of participants
that choose into the ”cooperative” group rises with the degree of popula-
tion viscosity. Average proﬁts for participants in the ”cooperative” group
are higher the more separated groups are. Under high population viscosity
subjects realize a signiﬁcant part of the possible eﬃciency gains of mutual
cooperation.
Population viscosity seems to enable an endogenous sorting of cooperative
and non-cooperative agents and to sustain persistent cooperation. Whenever
they are (at least partly) protected from exploitation by others, subjects
quickly learn to make use of group choice as a signal of their willingness
to cooperate. We also ﬁnd evidence for a positive relation between norms
and population viscosity. Participants of treatments characterized by high
viscosity tend to have higher intrinsic incentives to cooperate. Also the dis-
tribution of cooperator types changes with population viscosity. In short,
population viscosity seems a powerful and important mechanism not only
for sustaining cooperation given a distribution of cooperator types but it
also positively aﬀects this distribution towards a more cooperative society.
To further understand the way population viscosity acts on economic incen-
tives and norms gives rich potential for further research, both theoretically
and experimentally.
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17A Regression Results
Regression Results Cooperation, all Treatments
ci Coef. Std. Err P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
constant −.5211202 .1092775 0.000 −.7353002,−.3069402
b ci .0291948 .0013919 0.000 .0264667,.0319228
δi
B −2.84822 .1158171 0.000 −3.075217,−2.621223
Treatment1 (T1) −.7628143 .1492469 0.000 −1.055333,−.4702957
Treatment2 (T2) .2530817 .3071179 0.410 −.3488583,.8550217
T1*δi
B −.8251537 .1797644 0.000 −1.177485 − .4728219
T2*δi
B .3893097 .2087595 0.062 −.0198515,.7984708
σu 1.548935
ρ 0.421721
Table 7: Random Eﬀects Logit Regression Cooperation, 12800 Observations.
18Estimated ”Average” Norm21
Treatment T0
ci Coef. Std. Err z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
constant −1.516847 .2404864 −6.31 0.000 −1.988192,−1.045503
b ci .0826623 .0081416 10.15 0.000 .066705,.0986197
(b ci)2 −.0005378 .0000715 −7.52 0.000 −.0006779 − .0003976
δi
B −2.466043 .1262566 −19.53 0.000 −2.713502,−2.218585
σu 1.598325
ρ 0.4371011
Table 8: Random Eﬀects Logit Regression, Cooperate (4600 Observations).
Treatment T1
ci Coef. Std. Err z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
constant −2.098794 .2365592 −8.87 0.000 −2.562442,−1.635146
b ci .1056852 .0108448 9.75 0.000 .0844298,.1269405
(b ci)2 −.0007066 .0001133 −6.24 0.000 −.0009286,−.0004845
δi
B −3.252846 .1574204 −20.66 0.000 −3.561384,−2.944308
σu 1.587211
ρ 0.4336705
Table 9: Random Eﬀects Logit Regression, Cooperate (4800 Observations).
Treatment T2
ci Coef. Std. Err z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
constant −1.453488 .2358278 −6.16 0.000 −2.562442,−1.635146
b ci .0945457 .0087753 10.77 0.000 .0844298,.1269405
(b ci)2 −.0008529 .0001005 −8.48 0.000 −.0009286,−.0004845
δi
B −2.141006 .171408 −12.49 0.000 −3.561384,−2.944308
σu 1.166163
ρ 0.2924717
Table 10: Random Eﬀects Logit Regression, Cooperate (4800 Observations).
21From the regression in the x = 0 treatment we excluded 2 out of 48 students because
their behavior did not produce enough variation.
19B Instructions Treatment x = 1
3
Welcome and thanks for participating at this experiment. Please read these
instructions carefully. They are identical for all the participants with whom
you will interact during this experiment.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experi-
menters will come to you and answer your questions. From now on commu-
nication with other participants is forbidden. If you do not conform to these
rules we are sorry to have to exclude you from the experiment. Please do
also switch oﬀ your mobile phone at this moment.
For your participation you will receive 2,50 Euro. During the experiment
you can earn more. How much depends on your behavior and the behavior
of the other participants. During the experiment we will use ECU (Experi-
mental Currency Units) and at the end we will pay you in Euros according
to the exchange rate 1 Euro = 2500 ECU. All your decisions will be treated
conﬁdentially.
The Experiment At the beginning of the experiment we will split you and
the other participants equally into two groups — group A and group B.
In each round of the experiment you play a game against a ”representative
member” either from group A or group B that we will call in the following
your interaction partner.
Each round has three phases:
• phase 1: Each round some participants can decide whether to change
groups or not. You can make this decision for the ﬁrst time between
round 1 and 4 and from then on every 4 rounds.
• phase 2: You are asked to give an estimate about your opponent’s
likely behavior.
• phase 3: You play the game that we will describe in the next section.
The Experiment consists of 100 rounds.
The Game and the payments Independently from which group (A or B)
you are in, you play during the ﬁrst 4 rounds and in the second phase of ev-
ery following round the following game with a randomly selected interaction
partner:
In each round you and your interaction partner can choose between two
alternative, C and D. How much you earn in each round depends on what
20you and your interaction partner have chosen and in which group
you are.
Each member of group A receives the following payments:
Group A your match chooses
C D
you choose C 800 ECU 100 ECU
D 850 ECU 150 ECU
The table reads as follows:
• if both choose D, each gets 150 ECU (down right)
• if you choose D and your interaction partner C, you get 850 ECU (down
left)
• if you choose C and your interaction partner D, you get 100 ECU (up
right)
• if both choose C, each gets 800 ECU (up left)
Each member of group B receives the following payments:
Group B your match chooses
C D
you choose C 800 ECU 100 ECU
D 1000 ECU 490 ECU
The table reads as follows:
• if both choose D, each gets 400 ECU (down right)
• if you choose D and your interaction partner C, you get 1100 ECU
(down left)
• if you choose C and your interaction partner D, you get 100 ECU (up
right)
• if both choose C, each gets 800 ECU (up left)
21Who do I play with and how does this depend on my group ? In
each round your interaction partner is determined randomly. The probability
to interact with someone of your own group diﬀers from that of interacting
with someone from the other group. The following is true:
• The more members a group has the more likely it is to meet a member
of that group.
• Relatively it is more likely to meet someone from your own group.
The following tables give you an overview of the probabilities to interact
with a member of group A or B respectively, depending on whether you
yourself are in group A or B. If you are in group A the relevant table is table
1. If you are in group B the relevant table is table 2.
Table 1: you are in group A
percentage of participants in group A: 25 50 75 100
percentage of participants in group B: 75 50 25 0
In which percent of all cases do A 71 81 90 100
I meet someone from group B 29 19 10 0
Table 2: you are in group B
percentage of participants in group A: 0 25 50 75
percentage of participants in group B: 100 75 50 25
In which percent of all cases do A 0 10 19 29
I meet someone from group B 100 90 81 71
The tables are for your orientation. It can happen that the actual share
of participants in group A is not listed in the table. Each time we will thus
calculate the corresponding probabilities for you and inform you about them
before the start of phase 2.
Your interaction partner Your interaction partner in each round is not
another participant of the experiment, but a ”representative member” of the
group in which you are at the moment. He chooses the actions C and D with
probabilities that correspond to the shares with which the other members of
your group have chosen C and D.
If you are the only member of your group, the behavior of your interaction
partner will be simulated by the computer (but only in this case). In all
22other cases the behavior of your interaction partner depends exclusively on
the behavior of the other members of your group.
These rules obviously are the same for all other participants of the exper-
iment.
Example: You are in group A and consequently your interaction partner
will also be from group A.
• if among the other members in group A 70% chose action C and 30%
chose action D, your interaction partner will choose with probability
70% action C and with probability 30% action D.
• if all other members of group A have chosen action C, your interaction
partner will choose action C with probability 100%.
Information you receive Survey of the three phases and the information
you get
• Phase 1: Some participants can change their group.
• Phase 2:
(a) We inform you about,
∗ your current group,
∗ which share of participants is in group A and B respectively ,
∗ with which probability you meet a participant of group A or
B
(b) You give an estimate about the behavior of your match. Speciﬁ-
cally we will ask you the following question:
How likely do you think it is (in percent) that your match in the
next round will cooperate?
• Phase 3: you play the game described above with a randomly chosen
match.
After the third phase you are informed about which action you and
your match have chosen and about your payment.
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